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Do not ask whether they have a cognitive map, but how
they find their way about
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The publication of "The hippocampus as a cognitive map" (O'Keefe &
Nadel, 1978) has had a remarkable  impact, stimulating a huge amount of
both  behavioural  and  neurobiological  research on spatial  learning and
memory, involving both laboratory  and  field  studies,  and  employing a
variety of novel techniques. The reviews of this  general  area of research
provided by the previous contributors to this special  issue attest to the
progress that has been made since 1978. No one would now doubt that the
hippocampus is implicated in the use of configurations of landmarks to
locate a goal - in both mammals and birds, although the precise nature of
that implication remains a matter of much speculation and  debate. On
balance, however, the behavioural evidence does not seem to have supported
O'Keefe and Nadel's original hypothesis that true spatial or locale learning is
quite  distinct from simple associative learning and depends on the
establishment of a cognitive map of the environment.
"It's just the  study of rats in mazes" was a popular description of
experimental psychology in the middle of the 20
th century, and the image of
rats trundling their way through a maze,  learning by blind trial  and error,
became a symbol of everything that was wrong with old-fashioned
behaviourism. The publication of O'Keefe and Nadel's book,  The
Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map (1978), changed all  that. The study of
spatial learning and memory has flourished as never before. Over the past 25
years, psychologists, ethologists and neurobiologists have all mounted major
research programs to study spatial behaviour; the ability to find  their way
round their world is seen as of critical adaptive significance to the animals
who do so;  above all, the mechanisms underlying such behaviour can now be
seen to be a great deal more complex  (and  cognitive) than the traditional
denunciation of such experiments implied. New experimental procedures and
paradigms for the study of spatial learning, memory and navigation have been
devised, and new theories developed. As this issue of the journal shows, much
has been discovered in the past 25 years - but no doubt much remains to be
learned.
What is this spatial learning and memory that we are talking about? In
their natural environment, some animals navigate over long distances - from
summer to winter quarters, to and from their breeding grounds, to their homeN.J. Mackintosh 166
loft from a distant release point if they are homing or racing pigeons. Within
their home range, which may be as small as a few square metres or as large as
several hundred square kilometres, animals must find their way around, learn
what the limits of that range are, who occupies neighbouring ranges, the way
to food and water and the way back home, where they have  stored food for
later consumption, where predators may lurk, and where are suitable sites for a
new home. And they must remember this information for days or months.
Within the laboratory, rats have been trained to run through mazes to a single
goal box, or to find the single piece of food at the end of each of eight or more
maze arms radiating out from a central platform; they have  learned to find
food buried in the sand in one corner of a rectangular arena, and  to swim to a
submerged platform in a circular pool; in operant chambers they have  been
required to remember the location where a stimulus appeared a few seconds or
minutes ago. Birds have inspected the dozens of hiding places in which the
experimenter has placed a piece of food, and are tested for their retention of
this information when they are allowed to come back minutes or hours later to
find the food .  
In the natural world, all this is achieved under an extraordinarily wide
range of circumstances. Some animals travel by daylight,  others by night;
some through the air,  others through the sea or up rivers; some through a
landscape replete with landmarks, others across featureless desert. Different
animals  bring to the same laboratory task  great  differences in sensory
apparatus, and their performance also differs widely. It seems obvious that
spatial learning and memory must engage an equally wide variety of
mechanisms. And they do. To explain all, or even most, types of such learning
by appeal to a cognitive map is to rob that term of all explanatory value. We
need to ask instead exactly what are the mechanisms underlying any particular
example of spatially guided behaviour.
Orientation and Path Integration
The preceding sentences are not intended as any sort of comment on
O'Keefe and Nadel's book - which was indeed very  largely  devoted to an
attempt to elucidate what they termed locale or true spatial learning, i.e.,
behaviour based on a representation of allocentric space, or cognitive map.
They contrasted this with taxon learning, which they divided  into  two -
orientation and guidance learning. By orientation, they meant what an earlier
generation of  psychologists had sometimes called response learning: a rat
solving a T-maze by learning to make a left turn at the choice point. They paid
scant attention to another form of response learning - dead reckoning or path
integration,  since nearly all the elegant research demonstrating such a
mechanism in a wide variety of animals has been conducted since their book
was published. Rodrigo (2002) provides a review of some of this work, and I
shall return to it when discussing the work of Whishaw and his colleagues on
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Guidance to a Beacon
The second form of O'Keefe and Nadel's taxon learning, guidance, does
indeed  involve learning about a place, but just as much orientation learning
can be described as a form of instrumental condiditoning, so guidance can be
construed as Pavlovian conditioning. The rat in the maze associates the goal
box  stimuli with the delivery of food, and this Pavlovian  association is
sufficient to elicit approach. The visible platform in the Morris pool (Morris,
1981), or the beacon that Pearce and his colleagues attach to a submerged
platform (e.g., Roberts & Pearce, 1999), provide just such a stimulus - here
associated  with escape from the water. Backward chaining of such
associations will allow the rat to thread his way through a long and tortuous
maze with numerous dead ends, by approaching at any point in the maze those
stimuli  most closely (in time)  associated with the final reward (Deutsch,
1960). When people have  learned a route through a map of an imaginary
town,  some of them (mostly females) will describe the correct route simply as
a list of the street names, buildings and other landmarks in the order in which
they are encountered as the route is followed (Galea & Kimura, 1993).
Although  such  guidance learning is quite sufficient to solve many
spatial problems, it is not a specifically spatial  solution. An ordered list of
landmarks encountered along a route encodes information about the temporal
sequence in which they were experienced, but nothing about the spatial
relationships  between  them.  Other participants in Galea and Kimura's
experiment  (mostly  males) did describe the route in spatial terms -  as
compass  directions and distances between  places en route. There was,
moreover, a significant correlation between such performance and scores on a
test of mental rotation - a standard measure of visuo-spatial ability in IQ tests.
The rat swimming towards the visible platform, or beacon attached to it,
in the  Morris pool, does not need to know anything about the spatial location
of the platform or beacon with reference to any other feature of  the pool or
experimental room. He need only know that certain swimming movements
cause the platform to come nearer. In order to  attribute specifically spatial
knowledge to the rat with any degree of confidence, we must  alter the
conditions of the experiment.
Off-goal Beacons
In an animal's natural environment, it must surely often be the case that
his goal (whether home or food or another animal) is not conveniently marked
by a salient beacon sitting right on top of it. If  there is a beacon close by the
goal, an animal may first approach the beacon by the guidance mechanism just
outlined, but if the goal remains invisible, what is he to do next?  If the goal is
very close to the beacon, a random search round the beacon will find the goal
soon enough. It is also clear that animals can learn, by a variety of
mechanisms which differ in different species (see Rodrigo, 2002), the exact
distance  between  beacon  and  goal,  and  thus  confine their search to the
appropriate distance from the beacon. But beyond a certain distance, it must
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goal, in order to confine their search to the correct location. Some beacons
provide their own directional information, because they look quite different
when  viewed  from different sides.  But a perfectly symmetrical beacon
provides no directional information, and yet there is ample evidence that rats
will learn to search for a hidden goal only at the correct distance and direction
from such a beacon (Biegler & Morris, 1996; Roberts & Pearce, 1998). How
do they do it?
Sometimes, the experimenter's apparatus allows a simple solution. If
rats are trained to swim to a submerged platform in the Morris pool, when the
pool is surrounded by heavy  black curtains and there are four  salient
landmarks  round  the perimeter of the pool to allow them to locate the
platform,  they learn about all four landmarks, and can continue to locate the
platform when any two are available -  but not with only one (Prados &
Trobalon, 1998; Rodrigo, Chamizo, McLaren & Mackintosh, 1997). However,
if  one of these landmarks is immediately  next to the platform, this one
landmark may be enough to locate it (Chamizo, 2002). The explanation is
presumably that they learn that the platform is a particular distance from the
landmark, but also the same distance from the edge of the pool. This, and the
fact that the platform is not outside the pool, is enough to prevent them
searching in a circle round the landmark, without their needing to learn
anything about the direction from the landmark to the platform as such.
However, rats can readily learn to swim direct to a submerged platform
located 20cm due north of a beacon, even  when the perfectly symmetrical
beacon, and platform with it,  are moved around the pool from trial to trial
(Roberts & Pearce, 1998). This implies that they have learned  not only the
distance, but also the direction, from the beacon to the platform. Here then we
have  evidence of true spatial learning. What is its basis? How is direction
computed? A wide variety of birds and insects use the sun as a directional cue
under natural conditions, calculating direction by observing the angle between
their goal and the sun's azimuth position (Rodrigo, 2002). In order to use the
sun as a compass over any long period of time, of course, they must also
make allowance for the movement of  the sun during the course of the day -
and  over  the  seasons. In the laboratory, any distant, fixed source of
stimulation can be used to provide a similar directional cue. In our own
experience, the experimenter may have no idea what cues animals are using.
When we wished to train rats to locate the submerged platform in a Morris
pool by reference to four visual landmarks placed around the perimeter of the
pool, we found that in order to ensure that rats were actually  using  these
landmarks, it was necessary to rotate the landmarks (and platform with them)
from trial to trial. Otherwise, they clearly used static directional cues (noises,
draughts, odours in the room, perhaps even  some compass sense) that we
were unaware of. Presumably Roberts and Pearce's rats were using a similar,
unknown directional cue. But it would surely be worth testing that rats do
actually need a distant directional cue in conjunction with a beacon close to the
platform, in order to find a platform that lies in a particular direction from the
beacon. One could provide a specific distant cue,  and in addition to moving
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one could also rotate platform, beacon and directional cue all together from
trial to trial during  the  course of training. Test trials on which  only the
directional cue was rotated should then reveal whether the rats now searched
for the platform in the new direction.
Piloting: The Use of Configurations of Two or More Landmarks
The preceding case, where the rat uses a nearby beacon and a distant
directional cue to locate the goal, is only a special case of the use of two (or
more)  distal landmarks to locate a goal - the standard procedure in
experiments employing the Morris pool. Rats' ability to find the platform
under such conditions, and the dependence of that ability on the integrity of
the hippocampus, appeared to provide one of the strongest confirmations of
O'Keefe and Nadel's hypothesis of a cognitive map located in the mammalian
hippocampus. I shall usually avoid using that term, in part because it is now
used in too many different ways. For  O'Keefe  and  Nadel, of course, a
cognitive map is a particular, highly developed theoretical construct. Gallistel
(1990), however, regards any use of spatial information about distances and
directions as evidence of a cognitive map. Others (e.g., Pearce, Roberts &
Good, 1998) use the term in a relatively atheoretical way to refer to the ability
to  locate a goal by the use of extraneous landmarks;  while Prados and
Redhead (2002) move back and forth between more and less theoretical uses -
although sometimes qualifying the term with further adjectives (traditional,
gestaltic) when referring to O'Keefe and Nadel's theoretical use.
The evidence reviewed by Chamizo (2002) and Prados  and Redhead
(2002) makes it clear that many of the phenomena found in experiments on
Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning and simple discrimination learning
are also observed in experiments where rats are required to locate a goal by
means of two or more distal landmarks. These phenomena include: blocking,
overshadowing, latent inhibition, perceptual learning, and changes in attention
to  relevant  and  irrelevant  cues. Standard associative  theories  have  been
advanced to explain all these phenomena (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972;
Mackintosh,  1975;  McLaren & Mackintosh, 2000; Pearce & Hall,  1980;
Wagner,1981). There is thus good reason to reject O'Keefe and Nadel's
original claim that such spatial learning absolutely requires explanation in
terms of a non-associatively acquired cognitive  map.  Whether  there is
additional evidence from such experiments that would provide support for
their account is a question I return to below.
Blocking and Overshadowing
This is not to say that associative accounts of landmark learning are free
of problems. As McLaren (2002) points out,  there is an obvious tension
between the occurrence of blocking and overshadowing between landmarks
and the evidence that animals often seem to learn about all available
landmarks, but navigate without error on the basis of any small sub-set. Error-
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four landmarks are available for locating a goal, they will share the available
associative strength between them (although the more salient ones might run
away with most), with the consequence that the associative value of any sub-
set of the four  will on average be substantially  less than that of all  four
together. McLaren's model retains error correction, but solves this problem by
supposing that the system uses the distribution of activation over units coding
the co-ordinates of the goal location, rather than their overall level of activation,
and that this distribution can be independent of the number of landmarks
being  processed.  Thus  having  been trained with four equally salient
landmarks, the system will respond accurately with any two. But the use of
error correction ensures that it is also easy to predict blocking.  Blocking is
generated because learning about any newly added landmark will be slowed
down, rather than prevented. As a matter of fact, many  theories of blocking in
Pavlovian conditioning assume that learning about the added cue is prevented
rather than merely retarded. It remains to be seen  whether there is any
difference  between  blocking  between  landmarks and  blocking between
Pavlovian CSs in this respect.
Associative theories have no difficulty in accounting for the finding that
intra-maze cues, or a beacon above  the  platform in a Morris pool, will
overshadow learning about the external landmarks that also define the location
of the goal (March, Chamizo & Mackintosh, 1992; Redhead, Roberts, Good
& Pearce, 1997; Roberts & Pearce, 1998). It does, however, seem difficult to
reconcile overshadowing of one landmark by another with the observation that
rats will learn about all four landmarks when they are available, but can solve
the problem with any two.  McLaren's model indeed does not predict any
genuine overshadowing, and he interprets the results of an experiment by
Sanchez-Moreno, Rodrigo, Chamizo and Mackintosh (1999) in terms of
generalisation  decrement rather than competition for  associative  strength.
Whether or not this is a reasonable account of these results, it is too soon to
say whether evidence of apparent overshadowing between landmarks  is a
serious theoretical problem; at present, the evidence is sparse, and we do not
know what are the conditions under which such overshadowing might occur.
Perhaps  overshadowing  will not be observed  when  landmarks  are spaced
evenly round a pool, so that each provides an independent directional fix on
the location of the platform. It is notable that the overshadowing observed in
the experiments of  Sanchez-Moreno et al. was between two immediately
adjacent landmarks, where it seems plausible to argue that they really were
redundant.  Under  other  circumstances, it is possible that landmarks must
differ greatly in their relative validity or in their proximity to the goal (as in the
experiments by Spetch, 1995) before one can overshadow the other.
Prior Exposure
O'Keefe and Nadel's theory suggested that prior exposure to a set of
landmarks will allow animals to build up a map, and that they will  therefore
learn to use those landmarks to locate a goal more rapidly than animals not
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support for this analysis, but rather evidence of latent inhibition, perceptual
learning and changes in attention. Here too, however, there remain questions
unanswered.  Although many of the results they review are consistent with the
associative  theory of perceptual learning of  McLaren and  Mackintosh
(2000), it is equally clear that many fall outside the scope of that model. For
example, if rats have learned that a particular set of landmarks has previously
signalled the location of a submerged platform in the Morris pool, they will
use those landmarks to find a new location of the platform more rapidly than
controls, even if the actual configuration of the landmarks, as well as the
location of the platform, changes between the two phases of the experiment.
Conversely, if they have  learned that there is no consistent relationship
between landmarks and platform, they will be slower to learn than controls
who have not seen the landmarks before (Prados, Redhead & Pearce, 1999;
Redhead, Prados & Pearce, 2001).  These are hallmarks of the kind of
attentional effect seen in other experiments on discrimination learning -  such
as those on intradimensional and extradimensional shifts  (e.g., George &
Pearce,  1999): animals have  learned to attend to cues that predict
reinforcement and to ignore cues that are uncorrelated with the availability of
reinforcement. They are quite different from the perceptual learning effects
produced by unreinforced exposure to sets of landmarks in experiments by
Prados, Chamizo and Mackintosh (1999), Rodrigo, Chamizo, McLaren and
Mackintosh (1994) and Sansa, Chamizo and Mackintosh (1996).
It is clear that one factor influencing the outcome of  these experiments
is  whether  rats  have to swim to the platform in the first phase of the
experiment, or are simply placed on the platform and allowed to observe the
landmarks (Prados, Redhead & Pearce,  1999, Experiment 3). This makes
sense. Theories of attention assume that differential reinforcement is needed
to drive changes in attention, and these attentional effects are mostly observed
when rats are required to swim in the pool in the first phase of the experiment.
Finding the platform after active swimming must be a more reinforcing event
than simply being placed on it. McLaren and Mackintosh (2000) have pointed
to other cases, most notably transfer along a continuum (Lawrence,  1952),
where differential reinforcement and unreinforced pre-exposure in the  first
phase of the experiment have quite different consequences.
Alas, the  story is not quite so simple. Pearce,  Roberts,  Redhead &
Prados (2000) found that placement on the platform in the first phase of the
experiment was sufficient to produce effects on subsequent learning  that
would certainly not be predicted by McLaren and Mackintosh (2000), and
which are better (although  perhaps not  perfectly) accounted for by
supposing that this experience was sufficient to teach rats to attend to relevant
landmarks and ignore irrelevant  ones.  Even  so,  however, they also found
important differences  between the effects active swimming and  passive
placement on the platform. If such  placement is sufficient to drive  some
changes in attention, it is still reasonable to suppose that it is less effective
than finding the platform after swimming round a pool. And the results of an
earlier set of experiments by Prados, Chamizo and Mackintosh (1999), in
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on  a  distinctive  observation platform in the centre of the pool, are more
consistent with  McLaren and Mackintosh's (2000)  theory of perceptual
learning than with any theory of changes in attention to relevant and irrelevant
cues. There is certainly no doubt that some of the earlier maze pre-exposure
experiments of  Rodrigo et al. (1994) and Sansa et al. (1996) are very much
more easily explained by that theory than by  theories of attention. It seems
plausible to suppose that the  opportunity to explore a maze is a closer
approximation to wholly unreinforced pre-exposure than is placement on a
small platform surrounded by water. But is also quite possible that there are
other critical differences between those situations where pre-exposure seems
to result in changes in attention, and those where it simply causes the sort of
perceptual learning effect analysed by McLaren and Mackintosh. As Pearce et
al.  (2000)  conclude, "it is likely that further research will reveal that the
influence of landmark preexposure will depend on the interaction between a
number of processes."
Geometry
We  live in a geometrical  world, with square rooms and rectangular
corridors with right-angled turns. So it is not surprising that we locate objects
by reference to geometrical features - in the near corner, in the middle of the
room, at the far end, and so on. Although the natural world of rats or other
rodents can hardly be so dominated by such regular right-angled shapes, the
work of Cheng (1986) and Gallistel (1990) establishes that they often use
geometrical information to locate a goal. If food is hidden in one corner of a
rectangular arena, rats will rapidly learn to search in that corner, but will also
search in the diagonally opposite  corner,  even  though  there are additional
salient cues that signal which corner contains the food.
In Cheng's experiment, the geometry of the arena gained control over
the rats'  behaviour,  even  though  there was another better predictor of the
whereabouts of the food. In a series of experiments in the Morris  pool,
Pearce,  Ward-Robinson,  Good,  Fussell  and  Aydin  (2001)  explicitly
examined whether the presence of a beacon attached to the platform would
overshadow or block learning about the relationship between the location of
the platform and the geometrical shape of the pool, when the normally circular
pool was fitted with inserts to make it triangular. They found no evidence
whatsoever of blocking or overshadowing.
These results are, of course, exactly what O'Keefe and Nadel's theory
might have led one to expect in  experiments on multiple landmark learning.
The apparent implication is that although learning about landmarks is not the
province of a specialised module,  independent of humdrum associative
learning, geometrical information is indeed processed by just such a module -
as  Cheng and Gallistel have  argued. It remains to be seen whether a
multiplicity of salient landmarks would be equally unable to overshadow or
block geometrical information. And it will  also be important to see whether
one source of geometrical information could block or overshadow another.
This should not be too difficult.  When Benhamou and Poucet (1998) trainedHow do they find their way about? 173
rats to find a platform, whose location was defined by its relationship to three
distinct landmarks arranged in a triangular array, test trials revealed that the
rats used the geometrical arrangement of the landmarks rather than  their
distinctive  features to locate the platform. If rats were trained to find a
platform located at the apex of a triangular shaped pool, it should therefore be
possible to provide a second geometrical cue by adding a triangular array of
three identical landmarks outside the pool, positioned such that the platform
was midway along the base of this new triangle. Would  one  observe
overshadowing or blocking between these two geometrical cues?
Does Use of Multiple Landmarks Imply a Map-Like
Representation of Space?
Animals' ability to use information about the shape of their environment
is remarkable, but although such information is surely spatial, we are not yet
postulating any map-like knowledge. Similarly, although the ability to locate a
hidden goal by reference to its distance and direction from a number of distal
landmarks clearly implies the possession of some spatial knowledge,  this
knowledge still falls short of that implied by possession of a map. Someone
who uses a map of a city to find his way from A to D, detouring via B and C,
can also use the map to find the direct route from A to D bypassing B and C
altogether. Presumably, therefore, possession of a cognitive map in O'Keefe
and Nadel's sense implies that experience of the route A-B-C-D not only
gives knowledge of the direction and distance between A and B, B and C, and
C and D, but is also sufficient to allow deduction of the distance and direction
from A to D in the absence of any experience of the direct route from one to
the other.
Given that a rat's information about landmarks must initially be acquired
from a limited local perspective, the critical question  would seem to be
whether, and if so how, such local information about the relationship between
landmarks in one part of the environment is combined with information about
other landmarks in other parts of the environment. Only if the representations
of such local scenes are somehow linked to one another, would an animal have
a  single representation of an entire environment. And only if they were
combined  in  certain  ways,  would that global representation be one that
encoded spatial information about the relationship between different parts of
the environment. A simple, alternative possibility is that the representations of
local scenes are linked together associatively because they occur in temporal
contiguity to one another as the animal moves from one part of the
environment to another. Just as maze  learning was explained by Deutsch
(1960) by postulating  the formation of an associative chain that linked
together the representations of cues in the maze in the temporal order in which
they were encountered, so it might in principle be possible to provide a similar
associative account of landmark-based navigation that did not appeal to any
knowledge of the spatial relationship between one local scene and another.
The nearest to such an account is that provided by Leonard and McNaughton
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the movements required to move from one scene to another. Gallistel (1990)
and Poucet (1993), on the other hand,  have  argued that local  views are
eventually combined into a single framework that encodes the spatial
relationships between them.
How to decide  between  these  alternative  views? As Rodrigo (2002)
notes, the traditional experimental test has been to ask whether animals are
capable of taking a novel short cut. The fact that Deutsch's  simple model
predicted  such  behaviour  under  certain  circumstances  should  have  been
warning  enough that this is hardly a decisive test, and Bennett (1996)
concluded that the existing evidence of short-cutting  provided  no grounds
for attributing anything like an integrated spatial map to any  animal. One
critical issue has been whether cues associated with the goal are visible at the
point where an animal starts to take the short cut (see the dispute between
Gould, 1986, and Dyer, 1991, about whether honeybees can fly straight to a
goal when displaced by the experimenter). Another is that path integration or
dead reckoning provides an efficient mechanism for short-cutting under many
circumstances. And a third is that the short  cut may not always be novel
(another problem with Gould’s experiment). Thus Morris (1981) trained rats
to find a hidden platform in a swimming pool, always placing them into the
pool at one particular  point at the start of each trial. They still swam straight
to the platform on a test trial when placed in the pool at a different position.
But, as Prados  and Redhead (2002)  note,  Sutherland,  Chew,  Baker and
Linggard (1987) showed that this probably depended on the fact that on early
training trials rats had initially  swum at random  round  the pool, and had
therefore had experience of approaching the platform from  all  possible
directions.
An alternative approach to the question has been followed in some
ingenious experiments by Brown  (1992) on rats in a radial maze. Brown
surrounded the central platform of the maze with opaque doors, each with a
small circular opening through which the rats could look before making a
choice. Thus they could only see down one arm at a time, but if they simply
looked down  an arm they had already entered on that trial, they were allowed
to retrace and look down another. The critical question was whether, having
retraced, they would go directly to an arm they had not visited on that trial, or
whether they would be equally likely to choose any arm. In fact, they chose at
random - once again retracing if they happened to look down an arm they had
already entered. But if a rat  retraces from  arm 1 because he remembers
visiting it already on this trial, and if he knows the spatial relationship between
arm 1 and arm 4, which he has not visited on this trial, he should go direct to
arm 4 in preference to arm 6, which he has visited already. If he is just as
likely to go to arm 6 as to arm 4, but retraces as soon as he looks down arm 6,
this implies that he does not know the spatial relationship between arms 1, 4
and 6. A subsequent experiment (Brown, Rish, Von Culin and Edberg, 1993)
suggested that rats would choose to approach and look down unvisited arms
in preference to already visited  arms.  But unfortunately it is open to an
alternative explanation. The logic of Brown's experiments requires that, when
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available to locate an unvisited arm other than its remembered spatial
relationship to the arms they have visited. Although the rats could only see
down one arm at a time,  there may have  been other unidentified directional
cues available in the experimental room, such as noises, odours or sounds, that
were perfectly detectable from the central platform (see  above, p. xxx). In
order to rule out the possibility of any such  reliance on static directional cues,
it would have  been necessary to rotate the maze and its surrounding visual
landmarks from trial to trial.  This was not done.
Much remains to be learned about whether,  and if so how,  animals
integrate information about different locations into an overall representation of
their environment. The evidence described by Chamizo (2002) suggests that
associative mechanisms are involved in spatial integration. But it is also worth
suggesting that many laboratory experiments place rather little premium on
such integration. The radial maze task does not really require the rat to do
anything more than construct a list of the arms already visited or not visited on
a given trial. The cost of looking down, but then withdrawing from, an already
visited arm is rather low, and the memory of having recently visited it is surely
most effectively retrieved by a direct inspection of  the arm. Spatial integration
may occur only if the cost of error is higher. This seems more likely in a
larger environment than that provided by most laboratory experiments. But it
is  also  worth suggesting  that the alternative explanations of short-cutting
noted by Bennett (1996) are not just an exercise in carping criticism. To the
extent that there are many ways by which animals can find their way direct to
their goal,  they may have little need to develop an integrated map of an entire
environment. As I argue below, even navigation over very long distances may
be achieved by rather simpler means.
Spatial Learning and the Hippocampus
O'Keefe and Nadel's theory  was, of course, a neurobiological one, and
it has generated a huge body of research on the role of the hippocampus in
spatial learning and memory. The reviews by Macphail (2002), Rehbein and
Moss (2002), and  Good (2002) in this issue make it clear that the
hippocampus is implicated in such behaviour in both birds and mammals, but
it is clearly misleading to describe the hippocampus simply as the locus of a
cognitive map.
Mammalian Evidence
There is no doubt  that damage to the mammalian hippocampus can
disrupt learning that has no obvious spatial content at all - the most striking
example being trace eyeblink conditioning in the rabbit (Rawlins, 1985). But
there can be equally little doubt that the hippocampus is also implicated in
some  specific  aspects of  spatial learning. The critical and best known
observation is that, although hippocampal lesions do not impair rats' ability to
use a localised beacon to find their goal, such lesions have a drastic effect on
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Garrud, Rawlins & O'Keefe, 1982;  Pearce,  Roberts & Good, 1998;
Sutherland, Whishaw & Kolb, 1983). The obvious interpretation must surely
be that such lesions have an effect on their ability to use configurations of
distal landmarks to locate a goal.
Several  lines of evidence  have  suggested to some commentators,
however, that this conclusion may require at least some qualification.  Thus
Eichenbaum, Stewart and Morris (1990) and Whishaw, Cassel and Jarrard
(1995) both found that if lesioned rats were given extensive training to swim
directly to a visible platform, they continued to perform reasonably well when
the platform was made invisible, and spent as much time as controls searching
in the platform quadrant of the pool on test trials  when the platform was
absent.  Whishaw et al. interpreted their results as evidence of “a dissociation
between  getting there and knowing where”: lesioned rats, they proposed,
could use external landmarks to define the location of the platform (they knew
where it was), but could not learn to swim directly to it. They attributed this
failure to an inability to use path integration or dead reckoning.  Eichenbaum
et al., however, showed that lesioned rats were not using the configuration of
external landmarks to locate the platform in the way that normal rats do, but
were rather relying on one or two prominent landmarks that were directly in
line with the platform from the fixed starting point.  When these landmarks
were moved, the lesioned rats still swam straight towards them, while control
rats continued to swim to the platform.
In both studies, lesioned rats were seriously impaired when required to
learn a new place task  with  the invisible platform  located in a different
quadrant of the pool.  Whishaw and Tomie  (1997)  confirmed this, and
showed that this was because they persisted in searching for the platform in
its original location.  This seems most plausibly interpreted as another
instance of hippocampal lesions  impairing spatial reversal learning (see
Rehbein & Moss, 2002) rather than any failure of path integration.  Indeed, it
is not entirely clear in what sense learning to swim to an invisible platform
should actually depend on path integration or dead reckoning. But Whishaw
and his colleagues have tested rats on a different task where path integration
may certainly be involved.  As described by Good (2002), rats were trained to
leave their home base, located just below one of eight holes distributed round
the edge of a large circular platform, in order to find a large piece of food
hidden somewhere near the centre of the platform, which they then took back
to their home base to eat.  Both control and lesioned rats learned this task
(Maaswinkel, Jarrard & Whishaw, 1999; Whishaw & Maaswinkel, 1998), but
when the  location of the home base was moved  for a probe test, control
animals, after an initial return to their old home location, immediately went to
the new location, and went there directly on subsequent trials. Their behaviour
on the first test trial implies that they knew the location both of their old home
base and of the new one. The former knowledge must have  been based on
landmarks, the latter might have been based on dead reckoning.  Lesioned rats,
however, did not learn to return to the new home base.  Once again, of course,
they were being asked to learn a reversal, and the fact that they persisted in
returning to the old base  suggests that their problem was indeed one ofHow do they find their way about? 177
reversal learning.  But when rats were blindfolded for a series of test trials
with the home base in a new location, control rats always went immediately
back to the new base, but lesioned rats chose at random.  This does seem to
suggest a failure of path integration.  But it is possible that the  loss of
flexibility implied by inefficient reversal learning extends to an inability to
switch strategies.  Lesioned rats presumably relied on a prominent nearby
landmark to identify the location of their home base during initial training, but
may have been unable to switch to dead reckoning when that became the only
feasible strategy on the blindfold tests.  The critical test would be to see if
lesioned rats were capable of returning directly home if trained blindfolded
from the outset.
There is other evidence that hippocampal damage does not impair path
integration or dead reckoning (Alyan & McNaughton, 1999), but one reason
for questioning whether a failure of path integration contributes to the effects
of hippocampal lesions on spatial learning and navigation is the accumulation
of evidence that hippocampal lesions affect performance on a much wider
range of discrimination problems, none of which require animals to navigate
to a goal at all.  This evidence has, of course, been used to argue that although
hippocampal lesions undoubtedly disrupt rats’ ability to use configurations of
landmarks to locate a hidden goal, this is not a deficit in spatial learning per
se, but rather a special case of a wider problem.  Thus Eichenbaum and Cohen
(2001) have  argued that hippocampal animals are unable to solve relational
discriminations; Sutherland and Rudy (1989) that their difficulty is with any
kind of configural discrimination; and Hirsh (1974), Rehbein and Moss
(2002), and Good and Honey (1991) that their problem is one of contextual
retrieval.
Each of these authors  can point to evidence of deficits in non-
navigational tasks in support of their theory (see Good, 2002, and Rehbein &
Moss 2002).  My own difficulty with Eichenbaum and Cohen’s  account is
that it is not easy to discern the common thread that unites the range of
problems they describe as relational.  The success of their theory seems to
hinge on the vagueness of their characterisation of relational learning.  As
Good (2002) argues, there is certainly evidence consistent with Sutherland
and Rudy’s configural theory, but a sufficient number of studies have  been
able to dissociate a specifically spatial deficit from a more general configural
one to question whether it can be correct.  Whether  their  subsequent
modifications will rescue it, or simply make it harder to evaluate remains an
open question.  The suggestion that hippocampal lesions disrupt contextual
retrieval finds direct support in a number of studies reviewed by Good (2002),
and one strong argument in its favour is that appropriate contextual retrieval is
what is required by tests of epsodic memory with which  human amnesic
patients have  such difficulty.  What is perhaps lacking,  however, is direct
evidence of the role of contextual retrieval in spatial navigation tasks.
Much has been learned about the functions of the  mammalian
hippocampus in the past 25 years – and much remains to be learned.  Some of
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and incisive behavioural experiments, but some will  certainly be resolved by
further advances in neuroscientific techniques.  I have talked glibly about the
effects of lesions to “the  hippocampus”,  when a variety of different
techniques have been employed by different experimenters to destroy a variety
of different structures.  It is beyond my competence to pass judgment here,
but  it  is  now  abundantly  clear, as Good (2002) establishes, that “the
hippocampus” is not a unitary system and that selective damage to particular
structures within the hippocampal system often have quite different effects.  It
is worth suggesting that similar dissociations may be found as more precise
lesions are developed in studies of “the avian hippocampus”.
Food-Storing Birds
In  birds, a quite different line of evidence  suggests a role  for the
hippocampus in spatial learning and memory. As Macphail notes,  those
species that store food in a variety of different caches have a relatively larger
hippocampus than related species that do not store food (e.g., Krebs, Sherry,
Healy, Perry & Vaccarino, 1989). There is also seasonal variation in the size
of the hippocampus in storing species that coincides with the increase in
autumn in the amount of storing they engage in,  and evidence that it is the
experience of storing that drives this increase (Clayton, 1996; Healy, Clayton
& Krebs, 1994). A similar seasonal variation in the size of the hippocampus is
seen in brood parasitic birds, such as cowbirds, as they search for suitable
host nests in spring (Clayton, Reboreda & Kacelnik, 1997). But  Macphail
points to what he sees as a significant problem in what seems, on the face of it,
to be a straightforward and compelling story. Differences in food storing in
the wild may be associated with differences  in the relative  size of the
hippocampus, but they are not, he argues, associated with consistent
differences in spatial learning or memory in the laboratory.
A variety of experiments with parids has examined whether food storing
species (e.g., marsh tits and willow tits) outperform non-storing species (e.g.,
great tits and blue tits) in experimental tests of spatial learning and memory.
In general, they have not (see Macphail & Bolhuis, 2001, for a more detailed
review).  However,  given a task that can be solved either by learning about the
location of a target or about its colour or shape, storing species have
consistently  responded to its location significantly more than  non-storing
species (Brodbeck & Shettleworth,1995;  Clayton & Krebs, 1994a). The
second family of birds that has been extensively studied is corvids - although
a problem here is that most corvid species engage in storing food to a greater
or lesser extent.  One exception is the  jackdaw,  which  has  performed
significantly more poorly than storing species in two different spatial memory
tasks  (Clayton & Krebs, 1994b; Gould-Beierle,  2000). The four North
American corvid species that have  been studied, Clark's nutcracker, pinyon,
Mexican and scrub jays, all store food, but are usually placed in this rank
order for their dependence on storing.  Clark's nutcrackers, for example, store
up to 30,000 pine seeds in the autumn, which they retrieve during the course
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at a time. Whether this should lead one to expect a similar ranking of their
performance in laboratory tasks which test spatial memory over a few minutes
or at most hours, is not at all obvious. And, as Macphail shows, no consistent
picture has emerged from such studies.
My  own reading of this  literature  leads me to a rather different
conclusion from Macphail's. The  comparison of storing and non-storing
parids reveals that the former are more likely than the latter to respond to the
location of a target stimulus  rather than to its visual appearance. The
comparison of storing and non-storing corvids reveals that the former
outperform the latter on tests of spatial learning or memory. At the very least,
this suggests that storing species are more likely than non-storers to attend to,
and therefore learn about, the spatial location of a target. This may not mean
that  storers  have a superior spatial memory as such  (located in the
hippocampus), but it will not really do to dismiss these results, as Macphail
and Bolhuis (2001) do, on the grounds that they prove only that spatial cues
are more salient for storers than for non-storers, just as visual stimuli are more
salient  for diurnal than for nocturnal animals. What is the difference in
peripheral sensory systems that would make spatial cues more salient for one
species than another?
Macphail  does  point to an important and consistent finding from
studies of "window shopping", where birds are initially allowed to see, but not
collect, food placed in various locations, and then return some minutes or
hours later to collect it. There is no consistent difference between storers and
non-storers when the food is visible, but not obtainable, in the first phase of
the experiment; but storers outperform non-storers when the food is hidden in
this first phase and the birds have to search many different sites to find it. In
this case, the non-storers, unlike the storers, make errors on test by going back
to sites they examined in the first phase of the experiment - even when those
sites  never contained food.  Since they do not make errors by going to
previously unvisited sites, Macphail concludes that they must therefore "recall
locations as efficiently as storers - that, in other words, their spatial memory is
as efficient as that of storers". Leaving aside the possibility that they are not
recalling previously visited sites at all, but simply have consistent preferences
for some sites over others, it hardly seems  an efficient memory system that is
unable to remember whether or not there was food in a particular location. As
the work of Clayton and Dickinson (1999; Clayton,Yu & Dickinson, 2001)
has shown, scrub jays remember not only where they cached food, but also
whether they later retrieved it, what kind of food it was, and how recently they
cached it.
Long Range Navigation: Homing Pigeons
Kramer's "map and compass" hypothesis, as both Rodrigo (2002) and
Macphail (2002) make clear, remains the most popular account of the ability
of migrating birds to navigate over long distances, or of pigeons' ability to
head off in a homeward direction when released many kilometres from home
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beyond doubt that  pigeons, like honeybees, use the sun as a compass; but
unless pigeons know that their home loft is, say, due north of the release site, a
compass that tells them which way north is will not get them home. Equally
relevant here is Perdeck's (1958) demonstration that adult migrating starlings,
if captured and transported several  hundred  kilometres  south from their
normal autumnal migration route, will compensate for this displacement and
still end up in their traditional winter quarters, but that young, inexperienced
birds simply carry on flying in their original direction and end up several
hundred kilometres south of where they should be. The adults have  both a
map and a compass; the young birds have only a compass.
Once again, however, we should not be misled by a particular choice of
words. The "map" that tells a pigeon that home is north of a novel release site
cannot possibly be the same as the "map" that uses a configuration of distal
landmarks to locate a hidden goal. As Pearce (1997) rightly remarks, they
have  had no opportunity to construct a map containing information about
landmarks at a release site they have never seen before. Bingman's
hippocampal lesion data confirm the distinction: lesioned pigeons  can still
head off in a homeward direction from a novel release site, but have great
difficulty in actually finding their home loft once they have  arrived in its
vicinity (Bingman, Bagnoli, Ioale & Casini, 1984). The final location of the
home  loft  is  achieved by the use of visual  landmarks  surrounding  it, as
Schmidt-Koenig (1979) showed many years ago, in much the same way that
the location of a hidden platform in the Morris  pool is based on the
configuration of landmarks surrounding the pool. In both cases, the ability to
locate the goal depends on the integrity of the hippocampus. But the "map"
that tells the pigeon that home is north of a novel release site is not based on
landmarks at all. It does not need to be, because all it needs to provide is rather
crude directional information. In fact, of course, if the release site is novel,  the
pigeon's knowledge must be based on extrapolation. A plausible story would
be as follows: if a pigeon flies 10km south from the home loft on initial
training flights and, as he does  so,  finds himself flying up a gradient of
increasing odour from a distant petrochemical factory, or increasingly loud
infrasounds from waves beating on a distant shore, then if he is released at a
site 100km from home where there is a strong petrochemical odour, or louder
than usual infrasound, it is a reasonable bet that he is again south of home.
Sometimes such extrapolation will get it wrong, but there is good evidence that
some  release  sites cause paradoxical, but systematic, errors in initial
orientation (Keeton, 1974).
A further lesson from the homing pigeon research should by now be
familiar. It is important to remember that the psychologist's attempts to isolate
different mechanisms underlying spatial learning and navigation do not imply
that animals will rely on only one of these mechanisms to solve a particular
problem. Homing pigeons certainly learn to use nearby visual landmarks to
locate their home loft, but clock-shift experiments can sometimes cause them
to head off in the wrong direction even if they are released only 1 or 2 km
from home, where they must surely be able to recognise some landmarks
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released from a new distant site, they must presumably rely on their crude
directional map, plus compass, to head off in the correct direction. But if the
same release site is used again, they will start learning to follow a route home
defined by visual landmarks (Bingman, Ioale, Casini & Bagnoli, 1987). And
although shifting their clock will cause normal birds to head off in the wrong
direction, even  from a familiar release site, anosmic clock-shifted birds will
head off in the correct homeward direction by relying on this learned visual
route (Gagliardo, Ioale & Bingman, 1999). So it is clear that pigeons learn to
use both visual landmarks and an odour-based map (plus compass) to find
their way home both from near and from far release sites. Does this imply that
there is no interaction or competition between alternative solutions, as studies
of blocking and overshadowing have led us to expect in the case of Pavlovian
conditioning or many other cases of spatial learning? Not  necessarily, of
course. But it would be interesting to see whether or not evidence of blocking
could be obtained here. If pigeons were trained to fly home from a whole
series of novel release sites north of home, but were then repeatedly released
from a new site further north of home, would they be less likely to learn about
the visual landmarks associated with this new release site than birds that had
received no earlier training with the initial series of  northern release sites?
CONCLUSIONS
The  contributions to this issue of Psicologica  provide eloquent
testimony to the vigour and ingenuity of recent research on spatial learning
and memory, and on the functions of the hippocampus and related structures.
That research has transformed our perception of spatial cognition, in addition
to significantly advancing our understanding of the diverse range of
mechanisms that underpin animals' ability to find their way  around  their
world. There is no doubt that the impetus for  much of this research was
provided by O'Keefe and Nadel's book. Not all of their theoretical ideas have
survived the onslaught of this research unscathed, but if the value of a theory
is to be found in the new ideas and findings it generates rather than its
ultimate truth, then The Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map deserves its status
as a modern classic.
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